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Recognizing the Valentinians – now and then
The title of this essay is intended as a play on the different meanings of the verb 
“to recognize” on the one hand, and those of the expression “now and then” on 
the other. To begin with “to recognize,” the verb can both be used for identifica-
tion, especially of someone whom one has seen or met before,1 and for denoting 
acceptance, either in terms of acknowledging a fact, a problem, etc., or in terms 
of approval. Used in the latter sense, recognition is often linked with institutions 
that can grant and deny official approval of something or express official appre-
ciation of someone. Nevertheless, recognition can also take place between indi-
viduals. This occurs, for instance, when one is willing to admit that a discussion 
partner has a point, even though one does not agree on that point, or on some 
other issues. In such acts, there are obviously different levels, ranging from non- 
existent through weak to full forms of recognition.
Taking into account the scale from non-recognition to recognition can provide 
us with a valuable new perspective on the study of ancient texts. It goes without 
saying that attempts to place individual authors on such a scale are unavoidably 
based on scholarly constructs of these authors’ overall views and intentions, and 
there is much variation in such constructs. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated 
below, there are indeed clear differences in how much early Christian authors 
were willing to credit their opponents’ views. A scale from non-recognition to at 
least moderate forms of recognition can be constructed easily, even though there 
is and will be considerable variation as regards where exactly individual authors 
should be placed on that scale.
The expression “now and then” in my title can also be understood in two ways. 
It can be used as referring to present and past, but it also means “from time to 
time, occasionally.” Those knowledgeable about Valentinian sources and schol-
arship are well aware that recognizing Valentinians, even in the “weaker” sense 
of identification, was then, and is now, a vexing problem. The Valentinians are 
now customarily placed in the group of “Gnostics,” and thus effectively removed 
1 Understood in the former sense of identification, recognition was a popular feature in ancient lit-
erature: “The recognition type-scene belonged to the storyteller’s standard repertory in ancient 
Greco-Roman narrative and drama, especially in epic, novel, tragedy, and comedy, where motifs 
of hidden identities, veiling and revealing, Sein and Schein, deception and discovery often played 
a central role in the plot.” K.B. Larsen, Recognizing the Stranger: Recognition Scenes in the Gospel of 
John (Biblical Interpretation Series 93; Leiden: Brill, 2008), 1.
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from what is conceived to be “true” Christianity. There is, however, a marked 
move away from this essentializing identification of Valentinians as “Gnostics,” 
and towards other designations. One of the points I seek to make in this article 
is that the distinction between the Valentinians and (true) Christians was far less 
obviously “then,” that is, in the early Christian period, than it is “now,” that is, in 
scholarly imagination.
The Valentinians conceived of themselves first and foremost as Christians, 
and sought to be acknowledged as such. Moreover, it was difficult for ordinary 
 second-century Christians to differentiate between Valentinians and other kinds of 
Christians. Irenaeus wrote his five-volume anti-Valentinian work Against Heresies 
(c. 180) precisely to distinguish between the Valentinians and what he conceived 
to be orthodox Christianity. While Irenaeus was adamant about not finding any 
value in Valentinians and their theology, other early Christian teachers, such as 
Clement and Origen, were engaged in a much more constructive dialogue with 
Valentinian Christians.
Problems with identifying Valentinians persist “now,” that is, in modern schol-
arship, where individual teachers and texts are constantly removed from, and 
added to, the Valentinian body of evidence. Doubts have been raised whether 
Valentinus himself or some of his alleged followers, like Heracleon, were Valentin-
ians.2 Moreover, there is a recent trend in the study of the Nag Hammadi library 
to disassociate texts in this collection from the Christianity of the second and 
the third centuries and to place them into a considerably later context, that of 
fourth-century Egypt. This trend has also resulted in revisionist views about texts 
that have customarily been classified as Valentinian. By way of example, Hugo 
Lundhaug has argued that the Gospel of Philip can be best understood in the con-
text of Egyptian monastic Christianity of the fourth and fifth centuries.3 At the 
same time, new candidates continue to be proposed for the Valentinian corpus, 
such as the Apocalypse of Paul from Nag Hammadi Codex V.4
Finally, it is no surprise that, after the deconstruction of “Gnosticism” as a 
scholarly category,5 similar efforts are now being made on “Valentinianism.” 
One recent study suggests that the whole concept of “the school of Valentinus” 
2 Valentinus: C. Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus?: Untersuchungen zur valentinianischen Gnosis; 
mit einem Kommentar zu den Fragmenten Valentins (WUNT 65; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992).
3 H. Lundhaug, Images of Rebirth: Cognitive Poetics and Transformational Soteriology in the Gospel of 
Philip and the Exegesis on the Soul (NHMS 73; Leiden: Brill, 2010). For my brief rejoinder to some 
of Lundhaug’s arguments, see I. Dunderberg, Gnostic Morality Revisited (WUNT 347; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2015), 9 n. 20.
4 Cf. M. Kaler, Flora Tells a Story: The Apocalypse of Paul and Its Contexts (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2008).
5 Cf. M.A. Williams, Rethinking “Gnosticism”: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); K.L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).
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is merely a heresiological construct.6 My view is that “the school of Valentinus” 
will probably stand the test of critical inquiry better than “Gnosticism.” While one 
of the most fundamental problems related to the latter is that this term does not 
appear in ancient texts, “the school of Valentinus” is mentioned in early sources, 
and a number of individual Christian teachers were linked with this group from 
the outset.7 While there is no denying the fact that heresiologists were eager to 
categorize their opponents for polemical purposes, they must have had some 
particular reasons why they linked some opponents with Valentinus and some 
other people with Basilides, Marcion, and other “heresiarchs.”
1. Talking about Recognition
In what follows, I will leave aside the issues pertaining to the identification of 
Valentinians on the basis of ancient sources, and focus on issues related to “rec-
ognition” in the stronger sense, that is, in that of acknowledging, acceptance and 
approval. This viewpoint is linked with the “Reason and Religious Recognition” 
research project, for which I presently work at the University of Helsinki.8
One way to articulate the project’s aim is to say that it seeks to take the next 
step from tolerance to fuller approval of the “other.” One of the key issues in the 
project is to explore acts of recognition, and especially religious views about peo-
ple that would make such acts possible. Risto Saarinen, the director of this pro-
ject, outlines the core of an act of recognition in his forthcoming study as com-
prising two stages:9
1. B (a person or a group) seeks recognition from A, and
2. A grants recognition to B.
This core act of recognition can be expanded in many ways; for instance, B can 
be specific about “as what” it wants to be recognized, and A can be specific about 
“as what” it recognizes B.
One possible outcome of recognition acts like this is mutual recognition in 
which B also recognizes A. Such acts of mutual recognition, however, usually 
presuppose that the parties involved are official institutions and on an equal 
footing. The best examples of acts of recognition of this type are official agree-
6 G. Smith, Guilt by Association: Heresy Catalogues in Early Christianity (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014).
7 For a summary of the arguments for the school hypothesis, see I. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism: 
Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 
2–5.
8 This project, directed my colleague Risto Saarinen, is one of the Finnish Centres of Excellence, 
funded by the Academy of Finland. I am the leader of a research team on antiquity and early Chris-
tianity; two other research teams in the project are focused on medieval and modern discussions 
related to recognition.
9 R. Saarinen, Recognition and Religion: A Historical and Systematic Study [forthcoming].
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ments between states or those between well-established churches. The relation-
ship between A and B, however, is often asymmetric in the sense that A represents 
the official power, whereas B, the person or group seeking recognition from A, 
is subordinated to A’s rule.
The asymmetric relationship is no doubt characteristic of the situation in which 
early Christians sought recognition from the outsiders in the Roman Empire. The 
most obvious cases to be studied in this connection are the stories about martyrs 
and other Christians seeking recognition from Roman authorities when sum-
moned and interrogated by them.
In such stories, the bar is sometimes set unrealistically high. The author of 
Luke-Acts describes the swift conversion of the Roman proconsul Sergius Pau-
lus into full-blown Christian faith as the result of his brief meeting with Paul and 
Barnabas (Acts 13:6–12). If we dwell on the question of “as what” Christianity 
seeks to be recognized here, the answer is not (as one might expect) “as one of 
the tolerated religions in the empire.” Rather, what is claimed here is that Chris-
tianity should be recognized as the only true religion.
The story of the conversion of Sergius in Luke-Acts also shows how recogni-
tion can be sought at the expense of a third party. It is the punishing miracle Paul 
performs on Sergius’ Jewish court magician Elymas that makes Sergius convert 
to Christianity so quickly. Luke thus uses the story of Sergius’ conversion to reaf-
firm a prevalent Greco-Roman stereotype of the Jews as open to magic, which 
in turn made them politically suspect and even dangerous in the empire. This is 
one way in Luke-Acts to bring home the opinion that the recognition of Chris-
tianity entails the non-recognition of Judaism.
2. Irenaeus, the Valentinians and Textual Community
Turning from Luke-Acts to the Valentinian evidence, issues related to recognition 
are very complicated. It is much more difficult to identify the parties “A” (the one 
from whom recognition is sought) and “B” (the one who is seeking recognition) 
in the debates involving the Valentinians. Let me start with Irenaeus of Lyons. 
He vigorously argued for non-recognition of the Valentinians, but it cannot be 
inferred from his rebuttal of their views that there were Valentinians who sought 
recognition from him.
We can also ponder “as what,” or in what role, Irenaeus writes against Valentin-
ians. While he did not have any official power in the empire, he doubtless had, and 
could have claimed, institutional power as the bishop of Lyons. This, however, is 
not the position he adopts in the debate. He neither calls upon nor mentions his 
ecclesiastical position in his account of why he set out to write his anti-Valentin-
ian work. He introduces his work against the Valentinians as “a concise and clear 
report on the doctrine of these people who are at present spreading false teach-
ing,” and his intention is to supply the addressee with “suggestions … for refut-
ing this doctrine, by showing how utterly absurd, inconsistent, and incongruous 
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with the Truth their statements are.” In short, he seeks “not only to make clear to 
you their doctrines – which you have long sought to learn – but also to supply 
you with aids for proving it false.” There are glimpses of Irenaeus as an ecclesi-
astical authority later in his work but this is not how he positions himself as the 
author of his work against the Valentinians.
Another noteworthy trait in Irenaeus’ introduction is the impression of close 
contacts between him and some Valentinians. Irenaeus relates that his account 
of Valentinian teaching is based upon discussions with some of “the disciples of 
Valentinus,” and on reading their “commentaries.”10 There is no need to assume 
that the Valentinians whom Irenaeus met had approached him in seeking rec-
ognition from him as an ecclesiastical authority. As Pheme Perkins points out, 
the picture emerging here is rather that of a textual community in which books 
were composed, copied, exchanged, read aloud, discussed and debated.11 Most 
“academic” texts in antiquity had little chance of success in the public book mar-
ket, and so were distributed more privately in the smaller circles of the learned. 
William Johnson’s valuable recent studies on ancient textual communities detail 
how the circulation of books and especially granting someone else access to one’s 
own work (either completed or in progress) were regarded as special tokens of 
friendship in such groups, creating and reaffirming the sense of belonging to the 
same exclusive club.12
Although Irenaeus was fiercely opposed to the teaching of the Valentinians, his 
access to their texts and his discussions with them show that he was part of the 
same network of early Christian intellectuals as they were.13 Although Irenaeus’ 
full-scale attack on the Valentinians and their teachings cannot be explained in 
terms of (overblown) criticism that one might expect in textual communities like 
this,14 his aspiration to settle the issue by argumentative means rather than by 
calling upon his ecclesiastical status fits this context well.
Irenaeus also delved into Valentinian teaching in order to offer a comprehen-
sive description of it. He did not simply reproduce the sources available to him 
but composed his own summary based on such sources.15 One notable difference 
10 Irenaeus, Her. 1, preface.
11 The relevance of this aspect for our understanding of the encounters of Irenaeus and Valentinians 
has been recently pointed out by Perkins.
12 For a comprehensive account of these aspects related to ancient textual communities, see W. A. 
Johnson, Readers and Reading Cultures among Greeks and Romans: A Study of Elite Reading Com-
munities in the High Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); cf. also idem, “Construct-
ing Elite Reading Communities in the High Empire”, in Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading 
in Greece and Rome, ed. W.A. Johnson & H.N. Parker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
320–30.
13 Ph. Perkins, “Valentinians and the Christian Canon”, in Proceedings of Valentinian Conference 
(Rome, October 15–18, 2013), ed. E. Thomassen [forthcoming].
14 For some examples, see W.A. Johnson, Readers and Reading Cultures, e. g., 42–62 (on Pliny’s liter-
ary community).
15 Cf. I. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 9.
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between Irenaeus’ account and the parallel but independent account in Clement 
of Alexandria’s Excerpts from Theodotus (43–65, “Section C” in that work) is that 
myth and scriptural proof texts are constantly intertwined in the latter, whereas 
Irenaeus offers a sample of proof texts Valentinians used to support their views 
at the end of his summary. It could thus be suggested that Irenaeus, by separat-
ing myth from proof texts, gave a new outlook on and thus, in a way, “invented” 
the Valentinian myth. This interpretation, however, is not completely certain 
since no scriptural proof texts are adduced for the cosmogonic tales related in the 
Valentinian Tripartite Tractate either. The juxtaposition of myth and proof texts 
may, thus, be a feature peculiar to Clement’s source. Furthermore, the similarity 
in the basic structure of Irenaeus’ account and the first two sections of the Tri-
partite Tractate suggests that the narrative outline of Irenaeus’ report indeed goes 
back to Valentinian sources. In comparison to the lengthy cosmogonical account 
in the Tripartite Tractate, however, Irenaeus’ report seems to offer a greatly trun-
cated version of the Valentinian myth. This supports the conclusion that Irenaeus 
did not reproduce any of his sources in full, as is sometimes assumed, but offered 
a summary based upon them.
Though Irenaeus can be commended for his efforts to study Valentinian 
sources, his work betrays very weak tokens of the recognition of the other. These 
tokens include the fact that he found the school of Valentinus important enough 
to be disagreed with, and the fact that, all his sarcastic and malevolent remarks 
aside, he made the effort to paint a relatively careful picture of the Valentinian 
myth. This is how far recognition gets in Irenaeus. He finds little recommend-
able in the Valentinians and nothing in their teaching. Irenaeus does not shy 
away from any of the dirty tricks used in ancient polemics, including gossip, 
burlesque, libellous poems, claims about one’s opponent’s suspicious ancestry, 
and accusations of one’s adversary’s sexual misconduct and other manifesta-
tions of lewd morality.16 Irenaeus pays lip service to the rhetorical skill and 
persuasiveness of the Valentinians, but only as opposed to the simple truth he 
claims to profess in simple style.17 There is, as far as I can see, only one notable 
“crack” in Irenaeus’ energetic vituperation. He is willing to admit that, while 
most Valentinians were immoral people, some of them were committed to high 
moral standards. Yet Irenaeus heaps scorn on such persons as well. In Irenaeus’s 
unrelenting polemics, these “better” Valentinians were self-important because 
of their virtuous lifestyle and showed off their good morality, walking around 
“like Gallian roosters.”18
Irenaeus also possibly mispresents the materials he got access to, or learned 
about, in the textual community to which both he and the Valentinians belonged. 
Irenaeus accuses the Valentinians of “producing their own compositions (con-
16 Gossiping: Irenaeus, Her. 1.13.4–7; burlesque: 1.4.4; 1.11.4–5; libellous poem: 1.15.6; claims about 
one’s opponent’s suspicious ancestry: 1.23–31: 1.31.3; lewd morality: 1.6.3–4; 1.13.5–6, etc.
17 Irenaeus, Her. 1, preface.
18 Irenaeus, Her. 3.15.2.
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scriptiones),” and presents the text called the Gospel of Truth (veritatis euangelium) 
as the prime example of the audacity (audacie), which their production of new 
books expresses.19 Irenaeus claims, furthermore, that this particular text “does 
not at all conform to the gospels of the apostles” (apostolorum evangeliis).  Irenaeus 
thus insinuates that this text belongs to the same category as, and competes with, 
the New Testament gospels. If the text Irenaeus referred to was the same as or 
similar to the Gospel of Truth included in the Nag Hammadi Library, nothing 
could be further off the mark. This text does not purport to be a story of the life 
of Jesus but offers an eloquent reflection on the nature of the Father of All and 
of the role of Jesus as the revealer. The word “gospel,” used in the opening line of 
this text, is used not as a genre designation but simply as meaning “good news”: 
“The good news (“gospel”) about truth is joy for those who have received grace 
from the Father of truth …” (NHC I, 16).20
The early reactions to Irenaeus’ account of Valentinians were split, which 
may indicate that he went too far in his polemics for some tastes. In his Against 
Valentinians, Tertullian almost slavishly followed Irenaeus, only adding new 
jokes and quips from time to time. Tertullian knew, or knew about, some first-
hand Valentinian sources but paid little attention to them.21 There are also some 
glimpses of him being informed about some particularities of Valentinian the-
ology that are not mentioned in Irenaeus.22 Epiphanius of Salamis, who wrote in 
the late fourth century, largely based his anti-Valentinian report on long direct 
quotations from Irenaeus, though he also knew – and (unlike Tertullian) also 
quoted – some first-hand Valentinian texts, such as Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora and 
the Valentinian Instructional Letter.23
A somewhat different reaction to Irenaeus is attested in the Refutation of All 
Heresies, customarily but not unanimously attributed to Hippolytus of Rome. 
The author of this work drew heavily on Irenaeus’ account, but he also recorded 
protests that some followers of the Valentinian Marcus had raised against that 
account. After mentioning Irenaeus’ report on Marcosian baptismal rituals, the 
author of the Refutation continues: “When they read (ἐντυχόντες)24 this, they, 
as is their wont, denied that this was their tradition.” One may be entitled to see 
19 Irenaeus, Her. 3.11.9.
20 The manuscript of this text in NHC I does not have a separate title (either at the beginning or at 
the end). The present title modern scholars use for this text in scholarship is derived from its open-
ing words. Nevertheless, this was not an unusual way of identifying texts in antiquity either. Hence 
the possibility that the text Irenaeus refers to is the same as, or similar to, the Gospel of Truth now 
available to us in the Nag Hammadi Library.
21 Tertullian (The Flesh of Christ, 17.1) mentions one Alexander, who in support of his teaching called 
upon “the psalms of Valentinus.” Clement of Alexandria could have been subjected to the same 
accusation (see below)!
22 Tertullian, Val. 4.2, suggests that the great number of eternal beings (aeons) should be understood 
as “names and positions”, rather than more literally as a household of divine beings.
23 Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora: Epiphanius, Pan. 33.3.1–7.10; Valentinian Instructional Letter: 31.5–6.
24 For this sense of the verb, see LSJ s.v. III.
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here a minor act of recognition since the author finds the reason “to study more 
carefully and find out in detail what their tradition on the first baptism … and 
on the second, which they call ‘redemption,’ is in this protest.”25
3. Stronger Recognition: Clement of Alexandria
Stronger signals of recognition can be found in the works of two Alexandrian 
teachers, Clement and Origen. Although their anti-Valentinian sentiments are 
unmistakable through and through, both authors also occasionally express 
approval of some views put forward by their Valentinian adversaries. In what 
follows, I take a brief look at two texts, first, the fragments of Valentinus in Clem-
ent’s Miscellanies (Stromateis) and, second, fragments of the Valentinian Hera-
cleon in Origen’s Commentary on John.
Two general comments deserve to be first made as regards Clement’s views 
about the Valentinians. First, he did not resort to the same “dirty tricks” as Ire-
naeus in describing the Valentinians. (Clement did not completely refrain from 
those tricks in other cases: he mentions someone who called himself a “Gnostic” 
and promoted licentious behavior by claiming “to conquer pleasure by practicing 
pleasure.”)26 Second, Clement’s response to the Valentinians varies from work to 
work. Judith Kovacs points out that, in his more elementary work Christ the Edu-
cator, Clement rejects the Valentinian ideas “in strongly polemical statements”, 
whereas in the Miscellanies he shows “how the insights of Valentinian exegetes 
can be incorporated into the true, ecclesiastical γνῶσις.”27
The latter work, the more theologically inclusive Miscellanies, is also our main 
source for the fragments of Valentinus’ own works. Altogether six – and thus a 
majority – of such passages come from this text. The more critical side of the 
dialogue comes to the fore in the way Clement quotes and discusses Valentinus’ 
view about the creation of Adam. Fragment 1 of Valentinus offers a glimpse of the 
story in which the creator angels recognized a superior divine essence in Adam, 
became afraid of him and sought to hide or destroy him.28 Clement quotes this 
passage and another one from the followers of Basilides in his discussion about 
right and wrong forms of fear.29 While Clement rejects fear as a passion, he finds 
positive value in the fear of God and in the fear promulgated by the divine law. 
Building on the dictum “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,”  Clement 
25 Ref. 6.42.1; cf. N. Förster, Marcus Magus: Kult, Lehre und Gemeindeleben einer valentinianischen 
Gnostikergruppe: Sammlung der Quellen und Kommentar (WUNT 114; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1999), 28–29.
26 Clement, Misc. 2.117.5–6.
27 J. L. Kovacs, “Concealment and Gnostic Exegesis: Clement of Alexandria’s Interpretation of the 
Tabernacle”, Studia Patristica 31 (1997), 414–37: 431.
28 Valentinus, Fragment 1 (Clement, Misc. 2.36.2–4).
29 Clement, Misc. 2.32–40.
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finds educational value in God’s law since it teaches us the things we should avoid, 
including adultery, pederasty, injustice, and so on.
In this connection, Clement is outspoken in his criticism of Basilides and 
Valentinus: “These men are fabricating meaningless nonsense.” The main obsta-
cle in their view is that they presuppose the existence of lesser deities involved 
in creation. This can be seen in Clement’s response, which begins with the affir-
mation that “there is only one first principle.” Clement’s insistence that fear can 
be rational (as “the beginning of wisdom”) is especially targeted against Valenti-
nus, in whose story of Adam’s creation fear appears completely irrational and is 
linked with the inferior creator angels.30
Clement is keen to interpret Valentinus’ teachings in the light of typical prej-
udices linked with those of the “wrong side.” In Fragment 4, Clement quotes 
Valentinus’ teaching about the primordial immortality of humankind, and takes 
this teaching as illustrating a “typical” disdain of martyrdom among the here-
tics.31 The alleged link of Valentinus’ teaching with avoidance of martyrdom is 
far from obvious here, and Clement immediately moves on to a critique of the 
doctrine of two Gods, for which he sees evidence in another quotation from 
Valentinus, which contains reflection on how the perfect God’s invisible nature 
becomes manifest in the imperfect world.32 The passage distinguishes between 
God and the world, but since the distinction between the true God and the cre-
ator-god is not present in it, Clement must “produce” it by bringing in what he 
obviously considered to be standard Valentinian theology. Clement amplifies the 
intended effect by placing Valentinus here in the dubious company of Basilides 
and the Montanists.
Fragment 2 of Valentinus comprises a reflection on how the good Father and 
God alone can purify a heart afflicted by evil spirits.33 Clement also here links 
Valentinus with Basilides and, in this case, the latter’s son Isidor,34 but the link 
seems forced. There is no obvious link between Valentinus’ teaching on the impure 
heart and the Basilidean theory about the soul’s “attachments,” that is, the natures 
of animals clinging to the soul that drive humans into behaving like animals. It 
is more interesting to note how Clement steers the teaching of Valentinus in the 
direction of what he designates as “our truth.” This nod to Valentinus can be 
understood as a small token of recognition. Clement both puts Valentinus into 
30 Clement’s view about the educational benefits of fear comes very close to the view he attributes to 
Basilides’ followers in this section. The latter also designated “fear” as “the beginning of a wisdom 
which classifies, distinguishes, perfects and restores human beings to their pristine state.” For the 
view of Basilides’ followers (Clement, Misc. 2.36.1), see W.A. Löhr, Basilides und seine Schule: Eine 
Studie zur Theologie- und Kirchengeschichte des zweiten Jahrhunderts (WUNT 83; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1996), 61–78.
31 Clement, Misc. 4.89.1–3.
32 Valentinus, Fragment 5 = Clement, Misc. 4.89.6–90.1.
33 Clement, Misc. 2.114.3–6.
34 Basilides and Isidor: Clement, Misc. 2.112.1–2.114.2; for a comprehensive interpretation of this 
passage, see W.A. Löhr, Basilides und seine Schule, 78–101).
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bad company and extricates him from it. What happens in the relevant passage is 
that Clement finds a disagreement between Valentinus’ teaching about the soul, 
undergoing a change from worse to better, and the Valentinian theory of fixed 
natures, which does not admit of such a change: “For if he grants the soul the 
power of repentance and choosing the better course, he will be saying unwillingly 
what our truth says as dogma, that salvation comes not from nature but from a 
change in obedience.”35
The teaching that the soul is the place where the choice between evil and good 
is made is attested for Valentinians; Irenaeus mentions this view alongside their 
theory of three fixed natures.36 Clement, however, is inclined to see essence in 
difference; that is, he thinks that the theory of three fixed natures forms the core 
of Valentinian theology, while the more familiar theory that the soul can choose 
between good and evil is not part of that core. Hence Clement’s contention that 
Valentinus is saying something “unwillingly,” when the latter’s teaching comes 
close to Clement’s own views.
Clement, however, takes even firmer steps towards a fuller recognition, as can 
be seen in his discussion on Fragment 3. This fragment provides us with a surpris-
ing illustration of Jesus’ great self-control. Valentinus taught about Jesus: “He was 
firm, enduring all things. Jesus practiced divinity. He ate and drank in his own 
manner, without excreting food. The power of his continence was so great that not 
even food was destroyed in him since he did not have that which is perishable.”37
Valentinus’s argument should not surprise us since similar stories were told of 
legendary sages, such as Pythagoras, in the Greco-Roman world.38 What is surpris-
ing is the way Clement uses this teaching of Valentinus. One might expect scorn, 
or at least refutation based on the lack of proof in the gospels for this view about 
Jesus. Quite the contrary, Clement uses Valentinus to support his own teaching 
about self-control. Before the quotation from Valentinus, Clement specifies what 
self-control is: “Self-control means indifference to money, comfort, and prop-
erty, a mind above spectacles, control of the tongue, mastery of evil thoughts …” 
After quoting Valentinus, Clement formulates a conclusion: “So we embrace self- 
control out of love we bear the Lord and out of its honorable status, consecrating 
the temple of the Spirit.” In other words, Clement recognizes Valentinus here as 
a source of genuine Christian teaching and uses his teaching as one would use 
scriptural proof texts.
In Fragment 6, Valentinus contends that “Many of the things written in com-
mon books can also be found written in the church of God.”39 Clement comments 
that Valentinus here “makes the truth a matter of common knowledge (κοινοποιεῖ 
τὴν ἀλήθειαν).” As Christoph Markschies points out, this should not be taken 
35 Clement, Misc. 2.115.2.
36 Irenaeus, Her. 1.7.5.
37 Clement, Misc. 3.59.3.
38 Cf. I. Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism, 22.
39 Clement, Misc. 6.52.3–53.1.
Recognizing the Valentinians – now and then 49
as a reproach.40 Clement runs this quotation at the end of a section in which he 
argues that it was the same God who gave the law to the Jews and philosophy to 
the Greeks, and that those who practiced this philosophy (as a way of life) were 
easily won over in Hades to the Christian message that Christ preached during 
his visit there. Clement had already bolstered his teaching in this passage with 
a spurious quotation, which he attributed to Paul: “Take also the Greek books, 
read the Sibyl, how it is shown that God is one, and how the future is indicated. 
And take and read Hystaspes and you will find much more luminously and dis-
tinctly the Son of God described …”41 It is impossible to trace the origin of the 
quotation, but it serves the same purpose as one from Valentinus talking about 
the positive value of the “the common books.”42
4. Between Rejection and Approval: Origen and Heracleon
The examples discussed above illustrate that Clement “now and then” recognizes 
Valentinus’ teaching, although he is more often than not very critical of it. The 
same attitude towards proponents of Valentinian theology is apparent in Origen’s 
work. His interaction with Valentinians is best attested in his Commentary on John 
where he often quotes, discusses and interprets the Valentinian Heracleon’s views. 
Although Origen’s wealthy patron Ambrose was a former Valentinian, rebuttal of 
Heracleon’s views does not loom large in Origen’s commentary. Heracleon is not 
mentioned in the introduction to the entire work, and the intensity with which 
Origen is engaged in the discussion with his views varies from one book to another.
Much ink has been spilt in debating Heracleon’s theology in recent years, above 
all on the issue of whether he was a proponent of the Valentinian doctrine of 
three fixed natures (spirit, soul, matter) or whether his views can be understood 
in more flexible terms, admitting change from one category to another. I leave 
this debate aside here, however, and focus on the way Origen conducts dialogue 
with Heracleon.43
While Irenaeus was an ecclesial authority but did not invoke that role, Ori-
gen poses as “the man of the church,” who is up to the challenge presented by 
misguided allegorists like Heracleon. Origen portrays himself as being capable 
of stepping in to defend “the teaching of the Church” and putting the blame 
40 C. Markschies, Valentinus Gnosticus?, 189–90.
41 Clement, Misc. 6.5.1. “Hystaspes” refers to the Persian apocalypse Oracle of Hystaspes. For this 
text, see J.J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, ²1998), 32. The Sibyl and Hystaspes are also mentioned together 
in Justin, 1. Apol. 20.1; 44.12.
42 It should be added that Clement also supports this particular view with a quotation from Isidor, 
although he is even further off the mark than Valentinus from Clement’s perspective.
43 For a fuller account of Heracleon’s views and the variant modes of Origen’s responses to him, I refer 
to my essay, “Origen’s Dialogue with Heracleon and the School of Valentinus”, in The Oxford Hand-
book of Origen, ed. R.E. Heine & K.J. Torjesen (Oxford: Oxford University Press) [forthcoming].
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on “those who pursue the knowledge falsely so called.”44 Therefore, it is strik-
ing that Origen addresses his most biting remarks not to Heracleon and other 
allegorists but to the literalists, the “slaves of the letter.”45 In comparison to 
Origen’s outright rebuttal of the latter, his reactions to Heracleon are moder-
ate and much more nuanced, ranging from full rejection to moderate or con-
ditional approval. Here Origen’s approach to dialogue differs completely from 
that in Irenaeus, in whom one is hard-pressed to find any tokens of approval. 
To illustrate the range of Origen’s responses to Heracleon, I employ the model 
based upon modern questionnaires, which often operate with five variables: 
completely disagree – disagree – neither agree nor disagree – agree – com-
pletely agree.46 Instead offering a full survey here, I take up only a few exam-
ples to make my point.
Completely disagree: The most prominent issue to which Origen returns time 
and again is the heterodox teaching about two gods. It is thus clear that when-
ever the inferior creator-god is referred to in Heracleon (e. g., the royal man in 
John 4),47 Origen disputes this interpretation, but in another context grants that 
in one way the heterodox distinction is not far off the mark:
“Perhaps it is possible for someone to know God but not know the Father beyond know-
ing him as God … it is indeed possible to agree with the heterodox view that Moses and 
the prophets did not know the Father.”48
Origen also repeatedly rejects “those who introduce natures.” This refers to the 
theory that humans are divided into predetermined groups and that their salva-
tion depends on the group they belong to. The way Origen interprets  Heracleon’s 
teachings show that he was keen to place Heracleon among the proponents of this 
theory.49 Nevertheless, Origen did not want to push this point too far. He occa-
sionally reports uncertainty over Heracleon’s intentions on this issue. For instance, 
Origen conditionally approves of Heracleon’s explanation that the Samaritan 
woman “demonstrated a faith that was unhesitating and appropriate to her nature,” 
the condition being that Heracleon did not refer to her being of divine nature.50
44 Origen, Comm. John 5.8 (trans. Heine).
45 Origen, Comm. John 10.276; cf. 13.110, 146.
46 For a similar approach to the modes of Origen’s dialogue with Heracleon, see H.W. Attridge, Essays 
on John and Hebrews (WUNT 264; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 198–99; A. Wucherpfennig, 
Heracleon Philologus: Gnostische Johannesexegese im zweiten Jahrhundert (WUNT, 142; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2002), 25–26.
47 Origen, Comm. John 13.416.
48 Origen, Comm. John 19.26; cf. R.E. Heine, Origen: Commentary on the Gospel According to John 
(2 vols; FC 80 & 89; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989–93), 2.25.
49 E.g., Origen, Comm. John 20.54.
50 Origen, Comm. John 13.64; for other similar cases, in which Origen hesitates concerning  Heracleon’s 
take on this issue, see 2.137; 10.211.
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Disagree: One example of respectful disagreement is related to Heracleon’s 
interpretation that Christ’s shoe (the thongs of which the Baptist was unable to 
loosen) denotes the world. Origen applauds Heracleon for “taking the shoe as the 
world in a very powerful and ingenious manner” – but finally concludes: “I do 
not think we must agree.”51
Neither agree nor disagree: Origen sometimes mentions Heracleon’s teachings 
without commenting on them. Two examples: 1) “But consider also Heracleon’s 
assertion. He says that the Church received the Christ and was persuaded con-
cerning him that he alone understands all things.”52 2) He says, “For men believe 
in the Savior first by being led by men, but whenever they read his words, they no 
longer believe because of human testimony alone, but because of the truth itself.”53
Agree: There are a few cases in which Origen voices conditional approval of 
Heracleon’s views. One example (Origen and Heracleon’s views about the Samar-
itan woman’s nature) was already mentioned above. Another intriguing example 
is Heracleon’s explanation of the words “For the Father also seeks such to worship 
him” (John 4.23). Heracleon explains: “What belongs to the Father has been lost in 
deep erroneous matter and is being sought so that the Father may be worshipped 
by his own.” Origen responds: “If he were referring to the story about the lost 
sheep and the son who fell away from his father’s ways, we too would accept his 
explanation.”54 Heracleon thus offers a good explanation but for the wrong text!
Origen is sympathetic towards Heracleon’s view about the relationship between 
John and Elias, saying that he has made a serious effort to understand Heracleon 
at this point. Heracleon explains that the identification of John and Elias does 
not mean full identity but that John had Elias’ attributes, like clothes on him. 
Origen responds:
“I do not quite perceive how, in his view, being the Elias who is to come is John’s clothes. 
Perhaps it accords with our view … perhaps it can be said that this spirit of Elias is the 
clothing of John’s soul.” (6.114)
Completely agree: Origen commends Heracleon for his characterization of the 
Levites and Pharisees sent to John the Baptist:
“When he wishes... to explain why those sent from the Jews to question him are priests 
and Levites, his answer is not bad: ‘Because it was fitting for these who are devoted to 
God to be curious about these matters and to inquire. … His statement is convincing 
that the Pharisees inquire out of malice and not out of a desire to learn.”55
51 Origen, Comm. John 6.199.
52 Origen, Comm. John 13.164.
53 Origen, Comm. John 13.363.
54 Origen, Comm. John 13.120–1.
55 Origen, Comm. John 6.115, 126; Cf. H.W. Attridge, Essays on John and Hebrews, 198.
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Origen not only concurs but adopts Heracleon’s reading. As regards the priests 
and Levites, Origen points out that
“things are said with gentleness and curiosity … There is nothing self-willed or rash in the 
inquiry of these men; everything is appropriate to scrupulous servants of God. But those 
sent by the Pharisees … address the Baptist in arrogant and rather senseless words …”56
5. Conclusion
As those engaged in issues related to the philosophy of history point out, writing 
history is about making choices. Otherwise, it would be impossible to make any 
sense of the endless amount of the “raw data” available to us in historical records of 
all kinds. Taking this simple fact into account brings in the moral aspect inherent 
in all historiography, and leads to the self-reflective question of why, as scholars 
of the past, we make the choices we do in our research.57 One pertinent question 
that calls for a critical self-reflection is what kinds of issues dominate the narra-
tives of the past we produce.
I have outlined a broad range of early responses to the Valentinian Christians 
and their theology above. These responses bear witness to a conflict mode, but 
other modes of interaction with the “other” are attested as well. There is a long way 
from Irenaeus and Tertullian, who seek to defeat the Valentinians in every possi-
ble manner, to Clement, who sometimes built his own teaching on his opponent’s 
views, and to Origen, who occasionally paused to reflect on what his opponent 
truly meant. Different depictions of intra-Christian relations in the second and 
third centuries can be offered on the basis of different sets of evidence.
This range in the available evidence leads to the critical question of what part 
of the evidence seems preferable to the narratives we concoct of the past, and why. 
Are conflicts more decisive in our conceptualization of the past than examples of 
less aggressive relationships among people, and if they are, why? I assume many 
of us have been trained to focus on conflicts because they are thought to bring 
in change in the course of history. Another reason for a conflict-driven emphasis 
may be an implicit wish to produce a larger narrative of how the Christian church 
as it now stands evolved in the midst of early crises where its distinct identity 
markers differentiated it from Judaism and “heresies” developed.58 It may seem 
56 Origen, Comm. John 6.51–2; cf. 6.57: “John saw from the question the reverence of the priests and 
Levites.”
57 For one well-articulated analysis of such issues in modern historiography, see G.M. Spiegel, “Above, 
about and beyond the writing of history: A retrospective view of Hayden White’s Metahistory on 
the 40th anniversary of its publication”, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice 17 
(2013), 492–508. I wish to thank my wife, church historian and medievalist, Dr. Päivi Salmesvuori, 
for this reference.
58 For one example of this mode of explaining Christian origins, see G. Theißen, A Theory of Primi-
tive Christian Religion, trans. J. Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1999).
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an easier way to explain the evolution of the church as having taken place through 
bitter struggles, and we may find instances of constructive dialogue to be of less 
importance in this “big picture.”
If this is so, one obvious question that needs to be raised is whether the way we 
construct the conflict-driven past also reflects, or contributes to, how we conceive 
of the present and the future. The conflict theories of different sorts presuppose 
binary thinking since they require us to construct images of opposed parties that 
can be more or less securely identified in the historical evidence. One problem 
with such images is that they perpetuate the tendencies that are only promoted 
in the most biased of our sources, but this is not the only problem. Another ques-
tion that can be raised is whether the results of our binary imagination of the past 
reinforce the binary thinking that is so characteristic of the way people reason, 
and yet easily leads not only to one-sided but also to destructive thinking about 
the past, present, and the future.59 If it is true that “the historian must choose a 
past that serves his or her desire for a more perfect future,”60 perhaps it is our 
moral responsibility to take a more serious look than previously at the instances 
of more constructive interactions between past people in our evidence and use 
that evidence as something to “think with” in our conceptions of what “a more 
perfect future” could be.
59 One example I have in mind of such destructive results in our world is the way the muslims are of-
ten portrayed in Western media in terms of a binary opposition, that is, as the dangerous “ other”, 
regardless of how diversified their communities in reality are.
60 G. Spiegel, “Above, about and beyond the writing of history”, 497 (in reference to Hayden White’s 
view about historiography). As Spiegel points out, this approach to the historian’s task does not 
mean that we should or could give up the more historical aspiration to “to get it right.”

